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datum, existing since all eternity and simply revealed by the historian" presides 
over traditional narrative history. But the second ''the illusion that consists in 
the rational consent given to the ex post facto reconstruction of a necessity: 
nothing was possible except what took place" hovers threateningly over the 
new history (p. 20). Furet's aim is to define a moderate ideal of "problem- 
oriented history'' a resolutely ''intellectualist history," not necessarily quan- 
titative but fully conscious of its methods, its choices, and its premises and to 
steer a course between the reefs of "scholarly rationalization" on the one hand 
and ' ' spontaneous understanding" on the other. For by recognizing his own role 
in constructing his hypotheses and even his data, Furet's "problem-oriented" 
historian respects the freedom of the historical agents he studies and the open- 
endedness of actual historical situations. ''Conceptual" or ''problem-oriented" 
history thus ''protects its analytical power against the scientistic illusion" (p. 
20). 
Furet's ideal historian is a philosophical empiricist, for whom theory is an 
instrument of investigation rather than a metaphysics, and a political liberal 
whose fundamental concern is with human freedom. Precisely because it deals 
with "human action at the level closest to the freedom of invention," and because 
of its difference from the social sciences having borrowed ideas and hypotheses 
from the latter, it can test their explanatory power (p. 20) history turns out to 
be, for Furet, "the best antidote against the misleading simplifications and illusory 
rigor inherent in the notion of a science of society'' (ibid.). 
It is not an accident, therefore, that, in the majority of the essays in this 
volume, the author of the opening papers on historical methodology is himself 
not primarily a quantitative historian, dealing with economic or demographic 
series, but a historian and analyst of political and ideological discourses and of 
the powerful effects of man's representations of reality. Ideas, rather than material 
determinations or obscure mentalite's, are both the preferred object of Furet's 
investigations in this book and the locomotives of political action. 
LIONEL GOSSMAN 
Princeton University 
Movement and Institution. By Francesco Alberoni. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. Pp. 401. $45.00. 
For any who have wondered what Max Weber's work would be like without its 
wealth of historical detail and precision of definition, this book is the answer. 
Alberoni's range of reference is as broad as Weber's, but he says too little about 
each of the many cases he cites for any of them to really make sense. Like Weber, 
he devotes a large part of his work to classification, but, though many fine 
distinctions are made, little clarity is achieved. 
Alberoni takes off from the premise that there are two fundamental social 
states "which are present in every historical period and in every society" (p. 
3). One of these two states is institutionally organized, ''everyday" social life. 
The other is the nascent state: ''an exploration of the limits of the possible within 
a given type of social system, in order to maximize that portion of experience 
and solidarity which is realizable for oneself and for others at a specific historical 
moment" (pp. 20-21). It is important o stress that the nascent state is not at 
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root a kind of social organization but an experience. The experience may depend 
on structural preconditions, but it is fundamentally different, an experience of 
complete transcendance of everyday life in favor of a creative oneness. It is a 
social phenomenon, not an entirely individual and idiosyncratic experience. A 
movement is ''a historical process which starts with the nascent state and ends 
with the reestablishment of everyday-institutional order" (p. 221). 
Obviously, Alberoni s speaking of Weberian charisma, Durkheim's "collective 
effervescence," and the transformative experience that goes beyond rational 
class interests to motivate revolutionary collective action. He is greatly influenced 
by Freud and Marx, as well as Durkheim and Weber, and by such modern scholars 
as Alain Touraine, Mircea Eliade, and Victor Turner. Indeed, Turner, more than 
any other contemporary thinker, defined the same object of analysis in his accounts 
of "communitas." Where Turner was tentative and suggestive, however, Alberoni 
is all-encompassing and definite. The biggest difference, and the one that works 
most to Alberoni's disadvantage, is his failure to develop the brief case studies 
by which Turner illustrated what he meant by communitas (and liminality). 
Though Turner's The Ritual Process (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969) did not match the 
quality or sustained analytic development of his earlier works, it was not only 
provocative but very influential as well. Historians, sociologists, and other an- 
thropologists could read in it both something of the power of shared experiences 
of altered perception (which the 1960s had lately recalled to interest) and the 
rudiments of an analytic scheme for making sense of their symbolic structuration. 
Turner's work has sometimes been mistaken for more of a complete theory than 
it is, but Alberoni, in trying to achieve theoretical synthesis, loses purchase. 
Particularly, in trying to read so much of world history and the diversity of 
human experience through this one lens, he avoids coming to grips with other 
features of the movements he mentions from the birth of philosophy in ancient 
Greece, through several religions and revolutions, to the advent of Khomeini's 
Iran. This is unfortunate because Alberoni, like Turner, addresses an important 
issue, one that modern social theory seems systematically unable to grasp no 
matter how often it is mentioned and no matter how many empirical studies 
suggest its importance. As Alberoni himself implies, this may be most glaringly 
obvious in Marxism, which speaks powerfully to the structural preconditions 
and proper ideology for revolution but has nothing to say about its experience. 
Alberoni's book is organized into nine chapters. The first four establish what 
he means by the nascent state, its structural preconditions, experiential nature, 
and dynamics. The last of these, unfortunately, refers not to what concretely 
goes on in the nascent state certainly not to its content but, rather, to a very 
simplistic and abstract rendering of Freudian psychology. On this basis, Alberoni 
tackles group formation. Every nascent-state group is defined by contraposition 
to structures obtaining in the world of institutions: 
Fusion takes place, in other words, between things that were previously separate and there 
is opposition toward things that were earlier separate and now appear to be unified. This 
schema applies equally well to the Jew or the Roman who ''becomes" a Christian and to 
the members of separate African tribes that "become" a nation, or to workers of different 
firms, cities, or nations who "become" communists, or to women of different classes, 
political creeds, and nationalities who "become" feminists. The fracture separates them 
from pagans, whites, capitalists, and males, respectively.... We need to search for a 
sociological homogeneity in terms of class, rank, race, or profession in order to understand 
where the fracture occurred that produces depressive overload and thus the nascent state, 
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but this is certainly of no use in explaining why those particular people came into interaction. 
[Pp. 127, 128] 
The why, unfortunately, turns out to be a rather limp mixture of psychological 
propensity (apparently universal, not analyzed as a variable), personal affinity, 
charismatic leadership, and symbolic integration. 
Succeeding chapters turn to institutionalization, movements, ''cultural civi- 
lizations, " and the Western cultural tradition. The first two are self-explanatory. 
The third is an elaboration (but not concrete development) of the interesting idea 
that some sorts of institutions are able to call repeatedly on nascent state experiences 
and movements, gaining vitality from them but not losing integrity: ''These are 
the cultural civilizations, and although they originate as a movement, they are 
not in reality a movement but institutional powers that spread by means of suc- 
cessive movements without losing their identity that is, they are differentiated 
by means of successive movements without being fragmented by this differen- 
tiation. Moreover, even when fragmented and scattered, they have the property 
of being able to reconstitute themselves rapidly" (p. 261). Alberoni has in mind 
primarily the great religious traditions and Marxism. This is a clever way of 
thinking about the commonplace notion that Marxism is ''sort of" a religion. It 
also suggests something of what is meant by the cultural power of the great 
traditions and how this might be integrated with analysis of their institutional 
structure. The last chapter shows Alberoni's excess ambition at its worst. It 
takes up Max Weber's great project of accounting for Western rationality but 
moves from ancient Greece to the Soviet Union in less than fifty pages, complete 
with innumerable sidetracks. The burden of the chapter is to show that: ''in the 
West, unlike what happened in the East, certain conditions must have formed 
whereby the leading institutions of society were founded on the nascent state 
and its rational elaboration. Rationality is understood as a control and verification 
of whether the institution preserves as much as possible of the nascent-state 
experience" (p. 334). Like Weber, Alberoni sees Western culture as distinctive, 
largely because of its rationality. He does not, however, improve on Weber's 
account of the development of rationality. And, if his own contribution is to be 
more attentive to its sociopsychological roots, we are left wondering why human 
nature on the one hand, and the nascent state on the other, have such different 
products in different parts of the world. 
Alberoni is learned; he has insights; his topic is important. Alas, his treatment 
is discursive, with moFe definitions than analysis, and more casual references 
than evidence. It is unfortunate that he never develops his theory with either 
formal precision or empirical richness. 
CRAIG CALHOUN 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
The Practice of Everyday Life. By Michel de Certeau. Translated by Steven 
Rendall . 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xxiv + 229. 
$24.95. 
Michel de Certeau should be better known. Even in France, he does not enjoy 
the vogue that might be predicted for work of such originality. The Practice of 
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